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Against the Theistic Multiverse
Sara L. Uckelman
Abstract
We argue that Kraay’s “theistic multiverse” response to the
objections to theism [11] is unsuccessful as it simply shifts the
problems leveled against theism from the level of possible worlds
to the level of possible universes. Furthermore, when we restate
the objections at the level of possible universes, we can show
how Kraay’s conclusion about the uniqueness of the theistic
multiverse is undermined.
Keywords: multiverse, possible world, problem of evil, theism,
universe
1 Introduction
The “theistic multiverse” is an account of the nature of possible worlds
that purportedly solves various objections against theism that are raised
by interpreting possible worlds as universes. Multiverse theodicies,
whether as solutions to various anti-theistic arguments or motivated by
other reasons, have been argued for or espoused by, among others, the
authors of [2, 11, 12, 16, 21, 22]; for an overview on what has also been
called “multiverse deism”, see [4, 5, 9]. In this paper we focus specifi-
cally on Kraay’s account [11], because of a particular criticism that can
be leveled against it: Namely, all of the problems that he hopes to solve
by introducing a multiverse account of possible worlds can simply be
replicated at the level of universes.
Our plan is as follows: In the next section, we briefly summarize
Kraay’s multiverse account, defining key terms, and showing how he
thinks it can respond to certain challenges to theism. This allows us,
in §3, to prove the main result of the paper, namely, that Kraay has
not solved the problems, merely shifted where they occur. We also show
how this undermines his original arguments. In §4, we look at a response
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which raises similar — but not identical — problems for Kraay’s account,
due to Johnson [6]. We conclude in §5.
2 Kraay’s theistic multiverse
According to Kraay, “a universe is a spatiotemporally interrelated,
causally closed aggregate” [11, p. 359], and a multiverse is a world that
comprises more than one universe [11, p. 359]. Thus, universes are not
identified with possible worlds, nor are possible worlds “physical con-
tainers for universes” [11, p. 360]. Rather,
a possible world is simply comprised of whatever universes
there are in that world, together with whatever nonphysical
entities there are [11, p. 360].
The following are consequences of and constraints on Kraay’s ac-
count, which either hold by definition or are argued for by Kraay (the
details of the arguments need not concern us here):
1. Possible worlds either contain one universe or more than one uni-
verse.
2. In a possible world with more than one universe, all universes
within the world must be “logically compossible: by definition,
there can be no logical contradiction between different universes
within one possible world” [11, p. 360].
3. At most one copy of any universe can be present in a possible world
[11, p. 360].
4. The same universe may be present in more than one possible world.
5. There is trans-universe identity, but no trans-world identity [11,
p. 360].
Kraay introduces these multiverses to solve a trilemma for theism: He
argues that if all worlds are comprised of a single universe (hence al-
lowing us to identify possible worlds and universes), then “it seems that
either there is (a) exactly one best possible world [EOUW]; or (b) more
than one unsurpassable world [IMUW]; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of
increasingly better worlds [NUW]” [11, p. 355], and each one of these
has, historically, been argued to be incompatible with the existence of an
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being [11, p. 357]. With
Sara L. Uckelman: Against the Theistic Multiverse 3
the introduction of multiverses, Kraay can divorce the identification of
possible worlds with universes, allowing for there to be multiverses that
contain a variety of pretty crummy universes (such as, apparently, ours),
so long as these universes still meet some minimal axiological threshold,
without those mediocre universes threatening the status of a given pos-
sible world (i.e., multiverse) as being the best possible world. (In fact,
Kraay goes one step further to argue that the particular multiverse he
has in mind is the only possible world; we discuss this further below, at
the end of §3).
Kraay takes it as definitional that God will create1 every universe
that is (i) creatable and (ii) worth creating (measured against some ob-
jective benchmark), and therefore proposes the Theistic Multiverse (TM)
thesis:
God creates and sustains all and only those universes which
are worth creating and sustaining. Furthermore, TM com-
prises no other universes [11, p. 363].
Further furthermore, this theistic multiverse simply is a possible world—
and not only that, the only possible world [10, pp. 365–366]. It is there-
fore the best possible world, and this is compatible with our universe,
which is in this possible world, being subpar. This solves the trilemma,
by rejecting (b) and (c) and demonstrating how (a) is compatible with
classical theism.
3 Revenge
Our main thesis in this paper is the following: All of the possible-worlds
objections leveled against the theist that Kraay says his theistic multi-
verse account responds to can be revised and re-applied to his account of
universes instead. This undermines his arguments in two ways: First, it
shows that he hasn’t solved the problem, merely moved it. Second, when
we re-run the arguments at the level of universes rather than worlds, then
we are in a position to revisit Kraay’s argument against their being in-
finitely many possible worlds, and show that his conclusion (a) EOUW
cannot be maintained.
Kraay himself would admit that our fundamental question, namely,
“Is there any threat of revenge, that is, can the same objections to
possible worlds be re-run at the level of universes?”, is a legitimate one;
after all, he says that “the axiological framework of possible worlds. . . can
now be applied, mutatis mutandis, to universes” [11, p. 360]. If we can
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transfer talk about good-making and bad-making properties, we can also
transfer talk about comparing universes. It then follows that “either
there is exactly one unsurpassable universe [EOUU], or else there are
none [NUU] , or else there are infinitely many [IMUU]” [11, p. 360,
labels added]. Thus, we can shift the discourse from the level of possible
worlds (as it is in [11]) to universes.
So we are in a position to ask which of the following is true:
EOUU there is exactly one unsurpassable universe.
NUU there are no unsurpassable universes.
IMUU there are infinitely many unsurpassable universes.
We take each in turn below, but first, note that Kraay’s TM thesis
does not by itself require that there be more than one universe which
is worth creating and sustaining; however, we can reject this possibility,
because otherwise the TM possible world would not be a multiverse, but
a universe, and we would be back in the original situation, of there being
at most one possible world worth creating/sustaining (comprising only
one universe) and therefore exactly one unsurpassable possible world.
If there is to be a genuine trilemma between the three options, and if
the multiverse account is to not be degenerate, we can conclude that
on Kraay’s proposal there must be at least two universes that are worth
creating and sustaining. We shall call these universes u1 and u2.
3.1 EOUU
Suppose there is exactly one unsurpassable universe, u∗: It follows that
this universe is one that is both worth creating and worth sustaining;
for if it were either not worth creating or not worth sustaining, then it
would not be unsurpassable, for both u1 and u2 are plausible candidates
to surpass it. So we know that u∗ is worth creating and worth sustaining.
Then the question is: Is it the universe that we inhabit or not?
If it is the universe we inhabit, then the original problem of evil arises:
Our a posteriori experience shows that this universe is a rather meager
one; surely an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being could’ve
done a better job. Even if one of the worlds (that is, multiverses) that
this universe is a member of is unsurpassable, this doesn’t address the
fact that this universe still seems like it could have been better.
If the unsurpassable universe is not the one we inhabit, then we do
not inhabit an unsurpassable universe; we could have been in another,
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better one. Surprisingly, Kraay thinks that “there is no particular reason
to expect that we would find ourselves in an unsurpassable universe” [11,
p. 365]. But then we are faced with the question of why a surpassable
universe is one that is (1) worth creating and (2) worth sustaining. If
God could have put us (where by “us” we can mean either the actual
humans that are, have, and will exist in this universe, or humanity in
general, whatever universe they exist in) in a better universe than the
one that we are in, then why put us in this universe at all? Why is this
universe—deficient in so many ways—worth creating and sustaining?
Without answers to these questions, we are left in an awkward position.
Again, the traditional problem of evil is lurking in the wings: Why would
a omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God put humanity in a
universe which is not the best possible one? If anything, the problem is
even worse here than in the previous case, for if we have been placed in
the unsurpassed universe, that is a threat to God’s omnipotence (why
couldn’t he have created a better one?); but if we have been placed in a
surpassed universe, then it is God’s intrinsic goodness that is called into
question, for he could have put us in a better universe and didn’t.
Now, there may be reasons why the most benevolent thing God could
do was put humanity in a universe that was not the best universe; but
the burden of proof lies on being able to produce those reasons. Without
them, we have no reason to believe that a surpassable universe is one
that is either worth creating or worth sustaining, not when God could
clearly have done better. Therefore, on balance, we can discount EOUU
as a sustainable option.
3.2 NUU
Suppose instead that there are no unsurpassable universes, but that
every universe (including u1 and u2, and whichever universe is the one
we inhabit) has a universe that surpasses it. In this subsection, we show
that this option cannot be sustained at the level of universes.
We start from the suggestion in the previous subsection that a sur-
passable universe is one that is not worth creating and sustaining, then
we can easily show that this option collapses into the previous.
First, let us agree that there is at least one universe worth creating
and sustaining, namely, the one that we occupy. In fact, per the forego-
ing, we already know that there are at least two universes (u1 and u2),
and possibly three if the universe we occupy is distinct from both u1 and
u2.
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Now, by what we argued in the previous section, if we have two
universes, one of which surpasses the other, then only one of them is
worth creating and sustaining; the other is not. If we have more than
two, we can do a similar pairwise comparison across all the universes,
for instance, comparing u1 and u2, comparing u2 and u3, and comparing
u1 and u3. If we do so, then there are three possible results: Either (1)
we will be left exactly one universe, which surpasses all others and is
unsurpassed, or (2) we will be left with at least one infinite ascending
chain, or (3) there is at least one incomparable (or equivalent) pair of
universes (and in fact, we will show that in such a case there would be
infinitely many incomparable (or equivalent) universes).
The first case would occur if the pairwise comparison of all the uni-
verses resulted in a maximum, a world that is better than all the other
worlds. But if it surpasses all the others, then all the others were, contra
assumption, not worth creating and sustaining. In this case, we are not
in a theistic multiverse at all but a theistic monoverse, of the very worst
kind because not only is it a monoverse, because not only is the “TM”
the only possible world, we can’t even find another universe to inhabit
in this possible world. So if we wish to maintain multiverse theism, we
must take one of the other options. We cover option (3) in §3.3, after
we first show that (2), there is an infinite ascending chain of universes,
is problematic.
Let U be the set of universes (containing, amongst others, u1, u2,
the actual universe, as well as universes that are not worth creating or
not worth sustaining) and u′ and u′′ be arbitrary members of U , with
axiological statuses σ′ and σ′′, respectively. Either σ′ < σ′′, σ′′ < σ′, or
neither surpasses the other (either because σ′ = σ′′ or because σ′||σ′′).
If either σ′ < σ′′ or σ′′ < σ′, then one universe surpasses the other,
and we will exclude the surpassed one as being not worth creating or
sustaining, and retain the surpassing one. Then we can pick another
universe from U , and compare its axiological status to the one we kept;
again, if they are comparable but not identical, we will always throw
away one of them away, for this is just what it means for there to be an
infinitely ascending chain. But if the chain ascends infinitely, then there
would be no universe that would be created, because no universe that is
surpassed is worth creating and sustaining, and if there is an infinitely
ascending chain then every universe in that chain is surpassed; given that
there is such a created universe (namely, the one we inhabit), it cannot
be the case that this pairwise comparison would go infinitely. Therefore
there must at some point be either one universe that surpasses all others
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(in which case we’re in the previous situation) or we have at least two
universes that are either incomparable or equivalent in axiological status;
these then, are both unsurpassable.
Kraay himself argues that incommensurate possible worlds must ex-
ist [7], and uses this fact to undermine the rational choice model of
divine creation [17, p. 13]2. But are these worlds (i.e., multiverses) or
universes? If his argument is about possible worlds, then Kraay is con-
tradicting his conclusion in [10], where he demonstrated that there is
only one possible world. If, however, he is using “worlds” not in the
technical way he uses the term in [11], but following more ordinary us-
age to refer to universes, then we have corroboration from Kraay himself
of a position which rejects NUU.
Therefore, if we have at least two created universes that are incom-
parable or equivalent in axiological status, it follows that they are all in-
comparable or equivalent; for if any were strictly worse, they would not
have been worth of creation and sustenance. We thus do have, contra
Kraay, a particular reason to expect to find ourselves in an unsurpassable
universe, namely, because all created universes are unsurpassable.
3.3 IMUU
Now let us consider the final option, that there is at least one pair of
incomparable or equivalent worlds. We show that this option enforces a
stronger option, namely, that there are infinitely many such worlds.
From the preceding we already know that there are at least two
unsurpassable universes. The original argument in favor of there being
infinitely many surpassable worlds (rather than universes) is easy to
transfer to universes. The original argument goes as follows: “This
view is generally supported by the thought that for any world w having
axiological status s, there is a trivially different variant, w′, that also
has axiological status s” [11, p. 357] (the objection against the theist
then being: Well, why would God actualize one of these variants rather
than another? He does not act without reason, but what reason could
he have for picking on trivial variant over another?). Kraay successfully
blocks this argument at the level of worlds by arguing that there can be
at most one multiverse. But what happens when we shift our focus from
possible worlds (i.e., multiverses) to universes?
Because we can speak of axiological statuses of universes just as easily
as we can speak of axiological statuses of multiverses3, it follows that for
any universe u having axiological status σ, there is a trivially different
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variant, u′, that also has axiological status σ (for instance, let us consider
the universe exactly like the one we inhabit, but where my trans-universe
counterpart is 1cm taller than me; there is no reason to suppose my
height will affect the axiological status of either universe). That there are
infinitely many ways that universes could be so varied is incontestable.
(If you do not like the height-variation argument, then consider the more
innocuous case of a universe identical to ours except for the number of
grains of sand on Seaham beach.)
But if we can re-run the infinitely many trivially different universes
argument, then we are also able to have infinitely many trivially different
ways of collecting just as many good universes into a multiverse. The
issue we then face is this: We have infinitely many unsurpassable worlds,
each of which differ from each other trivially, and hence have the same
axiological status. Now, consider the possible worlds that can be made
up by taking sets of these universes. (That is, let W ⊆ P(U) be the set
of possible worlds, such that every w ∈ W is a multiverse.) If there are
infinitely many universes, it follows that there are infinitely many multi-
verses where the sum (or average; it doesn’t matter which measure you
pick) of the axiological statuses of their universes are indistinguishable.
Now, this alone is not sufficient to say that the axiological statuses of
the multiverses are therefore indistinguishable, because the axiological
status of a multiverse is not a function of the statuses of its contained
universes in this way. But at this point, it then becomes unclear why
it should be the case that the multiverse which contains all of these in-
finitely trivial many variations should be better than a multiverse that
is lacking, say, one of them, simply because the former contains more.4
(In fact, why do we not go the other way and say: If there are infinitely
many trivially different universes, why would God create all of them in-
stead of just one? There is no clear reason why God would create all the
trivial variants, especially when doing so does not increase the overall
axiological status of the multiverse that contains all of them.)
But even setting aside this possible response, assuming that God does
create all the infinitely many trivially different universes, taking away
one of these infinite variants cannot change the goodness of the resulting
multiverse: The two multiverses will still have exactly the same axiolog-
ical status. In fact, there will be infinitely many axiologically equivalent
multiverses containing different infinite subsets of these trivially different
universes. Thus, not only have we shown that the objections that can be
leveled against possible worlds can also be leveled against universes; we
have also shown that Kraay’s original conclusion, that there is exactly
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one multiverse, cannot in fact be sustained.
4 Other literature
We are not the first to find problems with multiverse theism or theistic
multiverses, whether Kraay’s or other variants. Others who have argued
against these so-called “multiverse theodicies” (or have at least argued
for their revision) include the authors of [1, 3, 13, 14, 15, 20]; however,
as they do so on radically different grounds than we do here, we do not
discuss their objections further. Instead, we concentrate on one person
who does make a similar-looking—but ultimately distinct—argument
against Kraay, namely, Johnson [6].
Johnson specifically responds to the viability of the theistic multi-
verse to respond to what he calls the problem of no best world, due to
Rowe [18, 19]. This is the problem of
the seeming impossibility of God’s existence given the fact
that the possible world that God actualizes must be unsur-
passable if he is to be the greatest possible being, yet it seems
that for any given possible world he could actualize, there is
one greater [6, p. 448],
that is, it’s a variant of the “Can God create a rock so big he couldn’t
lift it?” problem, and it arises in conjunction with the assumption of
IMUW.
Though this is not a problem that Kraay discusses directly in [11],
Johnson outlines how multiverse theists such as Kraay could respond to
the problem in the first pass: By doing what we have done above, and
shifting attention from the level of possible worlds to universes:
But the problem of no best world arises because of the
assumption that possible worlds consist of only one uni-
verse. . . However, there are possible worlds that contain mul-
tiple universes. In other words, some possible worlds are
multiverses. God wouldn’t have to just create one universe,
but could create a multiverse, and in doing so God could
actualize the greatest possible world [6, p. 451].
Johnson does not find this response satisfactory, and the way that he
argues that multiverses cannot solve this problem shows takes up a sim-
ilar line of argumentation to what we have argued above. He argues
that there are two reasons why the multiverse account fails to solve this
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problem. These are (1) the problem of no highest standard and (2) the
problem of multiverse cardinality [6, p. 447]. It is the latter, which turns
on questions of the cardinality of multiverses, which is interestingly sim-
ilar to our objections above. The question is this:
What is the cardinality of the infinite multiverse that makes
up the greatest possible world? [6, p. 459].
In our reply above, we did not mention different levels of infinite cardi-
nality; all that mattered for our argument was that the cardinality be
infinite. Johnson, however, argues that no matter which cardinality of
universes the best multiverse has, there is always a greater cardinality
that it could have. Thus, while we argue that there is no way to dis-
criminate between all multiverses of the same cardinality that are made
up of universes which differ from each other only trivially, Johnson’s
point is that we can discriminate between multiverses of differing lev-
els of cardinality, with, presumably, those of higher cardinality having
higher axiological status.5
Now, Johnson’s objection relies upon there being uncountably many
universes, whereas ours succeeded with merely countably many. We
stress this not to discredit Johnson’s objection, merely to indicate a way
in which it diverges from ours. Should an adequate argument for the
cardinality of universes being uncountable be provided, his objection
would stand.
5 Conclusion
What we have shown here is that multiverses do not get around the
trilemma that classical theism faces, at least if we take multiverses to
operate in the way that Kraay does. Moving from possible worlds to
sets of possible worlds (for, despite his vocabulary, this is what Kraay is
doing; there is no reason in principle why we need to identify possible
worlds with multiverses each containing universes, rather than identify-
ing possible worlds with universes and multiverses with sets of possible
worlds—in fact, doing so partly obscures the fact that Kraay has only
moved the problem rather than solved it) does not remove the trilemma,
merely moves it. Once the trilemma has been moved to the level of uni-
verses, we can also show that Kraay’s original argument, for there being
only one theistic multiverse, is undermined.6
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Notes
1 We follow Kraay in saying that worlds are actualized while universes are cre-
ated by God, because “while worlds are necessarily-existing states of affairs,
and are hence actualized rather than created, universes are contingently existing
spatiotemporal entities, and are thus created rather than actualized [11, fn. 25,
emphasis in the original].
2 Penner himself argues contra, that even if there are incommensurate possible
worlds, this does not undermine the rational choice model [17].
3 Note that for our argument, we do not need to motivate any particular axiological
principles to be used to determine the status of a given universe; we can leave it
completely open so long as there is at least one principle via which we can ascribe
positive or negative status to a universe. Kraay notes that though this position
can be questioned, “it is widely granted in contemporary analytic philosophy of
religion” [8, p. 30, fn. 4], including himself, it seems reasonable to take this as
given.
4 Note that our objection here is not the same objection as the one Kraay consid-
ered in [11, fn. 35], for he starts from the supposition that there is only a finite
number of universes. This is not a plausible supposition, and when we move from
finity to infinity, his cardinality argument no longer holds.
5 Contra this, however, see [3].
6 Many thanks to the comments of the anonymous referee, which resulted in either
my argument or the presentation of it being strengthened and clarified. Any
remaining issues of argumentation or clarity remain mine alone.
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